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Abstract
To understand how firms create and maintain long term relationships with
consumers, or how procurement relations evolve over time, it is useful to
study a dynamic variant of the classical two-type-buyer contract in mecha-
nism design. It is less trivial and more interesting if the utility determinant (or
utility type) is not fixed or completely random, and fair assumptions are that it
is either stochastic, or given by a distribution whose parameters are common
knowledge. The first approach is that of Battaglini (2005), while the second
is pursued in this paper. With two possible types of buyers, the buyer more
likely to have a high utility type will receive the first-best allocations, while
the other will receive the first best only if he has the high utility type.
Keywords: dynamic contracting, mechanism design, truthful reporting,
information structure, learning.
1 Introduction and Related Literature
The relationships between buyers and sellers are often dynamic in nature, and the
relevant private information will rarely stay hidden when there is repeated inter-
action. This has important implications for the pricing of products or the transfer
of goods between a principal and an agent, since the inefficiency induced by asym-
metric information may be reduced by considering the long term behavior of the
agent.
There are many ways to model repeated interactions between, say, a buyer and
a seller, and by the revelation principle the optimal mechanism will involve the
∗Department of Economics, City University London, EC1V 0HB, UK, scu2@duke.edu. I want to
thank my doctoral advisor, Prof. Curtis Taylor, and the seminar participants at Duke University,
for comments, suggestions and essential help in directing my work.
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seller reporting his private information, as long as adequate incentive compatibil-
ity and rationality conditions are satisfied. But, if the private information known
before signing the contract has no bearing on future private information, the prob-
lem is in a sense trivial. The dynamic contract becomes a pasting of static ones.
It is more interesting to consider that there is a link between the private informa-
tion at different times, and this link can be stochastic, or statistic – given by an
underlining condition like a probability distribution, or in general a combination.
In Battaglini (2005), we see the simplest form of a stochastic link: the utility type
evolves according to a Markov process. Here I considers the simplest statistic link:
the utility types are given by a distribution depending on a buyer type. The buyer
type could be common knowledge, but this would make the problem trivial again.
I will consider chiefly the buyer’s type to be the buyer’s private information, but
the problem becomes even more interesting once we explore the idea of a hidden
or partially hidden buyer type, which can be learned by both parties through re-
peated interactions.
It is important to look at such dynamic contractual relationships, since they
are increasingly important for the economy. As information technology advances,
tracking customers becomes easier and can lead to better tailored products and of-
fers. Moreover, handling such long term data can improve the customer screening
potential of companies which have the resources. A great example is the market
for mobile telephony. Mobile phone carriers have the ability to enforce long term
contracts, and the service usage can be carefully monitored. Moreover, the ser-
vice to users can be charged at different rates based on quantity brackets, and can
package utility increasing features into the contract – phone quality, text messag-
ing, data plans. The contracts themselves come with initial or overtime financial
commitments. The consumer can arguably have knowledge of his potential us-
age pattern, defining a possible buyer type, and his monthly consumption choice
would be equivalent to reporting a utility type by the taxation principle. Consider
also a monopolistic supplier selling to a small business or a company dealing with
its franchise. The company or franchise hold specific private information about
the profitability of the business, as well as about the day to day sales potential,
which would determine short term profits. Long term strategy must incorporate
the information from repeated interaction.
This paper presents the interaction between a buyer and a seller, with the buyer
has private information about his "utility type" and his "buyer type". The buyer
type will determine the utility type statistically, but all buyer types can have one
of the same utility types, so there is some overlap which makes buyer types un-
separable in a trivial manner. Considering the buyer type as private information,
it is clear that the buyer’s type will influence the type of contract that is optimally
offered only to him, as well as in a setting in which there are more than one buyer
type. It turns out that there is separation between buyer types, which for two types
happens through basically two contracts, where for reports of a low utility (type)
the quantities allocated differ.
An alternative approach to a similar problem in current literature is in Battaglini
(2005). He considers a dynamic interaction between a buyer and a seller much like
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in this paper, where utility only can change from a utility type determinant, and
this type is linked across time by a Markov process. This assumption may describe
the setting of a monopolistic supplier or a franchise owner better, at least when
it can be said that the profitability of the agent’s business is subject to a Markov
process because, say, the daily number of returning customers is Markov. In other
situations it makes more sense to consider that the profitability of the business is
simply determined by unchangeable factors – here the agent type, and random-
ness.
In a working paper, Pavan et al. (2009) attempt to characterize general dynamic
mechanism design problems in finite time, and again for an infinite horizon in
Pavan et al. (2010). They consider a general stochastic process for information,
with possibly non-time-separable agent payoffs. To obtain more explicit results,
they require continuity in the probability measure that determines types, and in
general, continuity in the total variation metric for the most general results. This
does not translate to the finite type case, where the differential conditions cannot
apply. One important observation they make is that the vanishing distortions at
the bottom principle (VDB) in Battaglini (2005) is not a robust result. In general,
distortions need not be monotonic in type or in time, nor vanish in the long run.
Courti and Li (2000) study a somewhat similar problem with two stages, where
the first stage is where the agent, an airline ticket buyer, finds out his type, which
restricts somewhat the buyer’s possible valuations for the ticket. Considering con-
tracts with partial refunds, the authors find that the informativeness of the signal
the buyer gets is what determines the optimal mechanisms, and not the uncer-
tainty that affects all the buyer types.
2 Describing the Model
Consider a setting with a monopolistic principal, or seller, and an agent, or buyer.
The buyer’s period by period utility function is given by
U(θ,q) = θq− q2/2− p(q),
where q is the buyer’s consumption, p is a price he pays for it henceforth deter-
mined by q, and θ is a utility, or demand, type determinant which can take the
values {θh,θl}. The buyer has ex-ante private information about the probability of
having a demand of type θh instead of θl in any one period. This probability is de-
termined by the buyer’s type, and can take the values {αh,1− αh} or {αl,1− αl}.
There is common knowledge that the only two buyer types appear with odds
{ϕ,1− ϕ} respectively. Later on, this assumption will be relaxed and generalized.
The reservation utility for the buyer is 0, and the seller has the power to commit to
a contract. Both buyer and seller are risk neutral and have no liquidity constraints,
so they care only about maximizing expected utility. We can restrict attention to
direct truthful mechanisms. The game starts in period 0, with the buyer reporting
his α value, after which he may have to make a payment, although we may assume
w.l.o.g. that the payment is deferred. In subsequent rounds, the buyer reports his θ
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FIGURE 1. Moves by nature. The vertical dotted line shows when the contract is
signed.
demand determinant, receives an allocation q and makes a new payment – Figure
1. Let generic θh > θl ≥ 0, 1 > αh > αl > 0, ϕ ∈ (0,1), but strict inequalities are
only to consider the interesting problem. In the following, I will focus on a game
with infinite periods, but sometimes I may also consider a finite period game for
description or as a stepping stone. Unless explicitly stated, the results will hold for
the finite as well as infinite settings. In the finite case I will ignore discounting.
3 Solving the Model
It is interesting to consider both the finite and the infinite time periods versions.
For the infinite setting, we could possibly use a recursive approach, but simple
considerations show that the number of relevant state variables grows linearly in
time, and it is not immediate in what way one can summarize the relevant his-
tory. Therefore, looking at the optimal direct mechanism for the finite game is
easier, and could possibly be extended with a continuity argument to the infinite
setting. For that, one typically considers rationality and compatibility incentive
constraints, which are then incorporated in a global maximization problem. How-
ever, as the number of time periods grows, the number of incentive compatibility
conditions will also grow polynomially. It is important then to par down this num-
ber to the absolute minimum, before proceeding to any analysis in this direction.
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3.1 Reducing the number of ICC conditions
The first step in the solving strategy is proving that the set of incentive compati-
bility conditions can be restricted somewhat. This claim will be proven for a more
general buyer utility function, and an arbitrary finite number of utility types l. The
utility function is Ut(θ,qt(·)) in round t, discounted if needed, where θ can take any
value from the finite set {θ1, . . . ,θl}, and the allocation qt(h0, h1, . . . , ht) is a function
of the history of messages the buyer sent. Fix U0 ≡ 0, since we can delay payment.
Here α is just an index for one of a finite number of probability distributions over
the values θ, and it has full support w.l.o.g. We can consider the messages ht to
be determined by a function of the buyer’s true type and demand type history,
ht ≡ σt(α,θ1,θ2, . . . ,θt), h0 ≡ σ0(α), where σ ≡ {σt(·)} is the player’s strategy. Any
direct truthful mechanism that implements a menu will have to satisfy individual
rationality constraints (IRCs) for each α, since the buyer has ex-ante information
about his type before he signs a contract.
∀α : 0≤
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(α,θ1, . . . ,θt)),
where Θt = (θ1, . . . ,θt) is one possible history of types for period t, and λα(θi) is
the probability of getting the value θi that is given by the distribution indicated
by α. For clarification, in our two-types model αh ≡ λαh(θh), 1− αh ≡ λαh(θl), αl ≡
λαl(θh), and 1− αl ≡ λαl(θl). The incentive compatibility constraints (ICCs) for a
direct truthful mechanism are
∀σ,α :
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(α,θ1, . . . ,θt)) ≥
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , ht)).
(1)
Proposition 3.1. The set of incentive compatibility conditions (1) is satisfied if a stronger
set of compatibility conditions (S) hold, whereby in each period the buyer considers only
one-time deviations from truth, followed by truthful reporting in the future. That is, the
ICCs are implied by the following set of inequalities, for1 k ∈ 0,n , ∀ σ,α,Θk :
Uk(θk,qk(h0, h1, . . . , hk−1,θk))+
+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt|Θk
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , hk−1,θk,θk+1, . . . ,θt)) ≥
≥Uk(θk,qk(h0, h1, . . . , hk))+
+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt|Θk
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , hk,θk+1, . . . ,θt)).
1To be exact, consider that θ0 = α. At k = 0 there are only the incentive compatibility conditions
for each type α, which are the same as the ICCs.
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Proof. For now let n < ∞. The proof is by induction. First consider a finite setting
with n periods. Let σ be any strategy, and consider a deviation from this strategy to
truth telling, only in the last period n, on only one of the possible histories. Assume
the following inequality holds. ∀ σ,α,Θn :
Un(θn,qn(h0, h1, . . . , hn−1,θn)) ≥Un(θn,qn(h0, h1, . . . , hn−1, hn)). (2)
It is just a special case of (1), and of (S) when k = n. Now, for a generic σ, it implies
that ∀ α :
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , ht)) ≤
n−1
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , ht)) +∑
Θn
n
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Un(θn,qn(h0, h1, . . . , hn−1,θn)),
so it makes sense to always report truthfully in the last period. This is the first
step in the induction process. In general, consider that the following holds for an
arbitrary 0 ≤ k ≤ n, i.e. that it is better to report truthfully from period k + 1 on.
∀ σ,α :
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , ht)) ≤
k
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , ht))+
+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , hk,θk+1, . . . ,θt)).
Assume that S hold. S say that, assuming future truthful reporting, the buyer
finds the total discounted utility from reporting his true type today is larger than
for any other report. Notice that this has to hold for all α, and for any history prior
to period k. Using S , rework the previous expression. ∀ σ,α :
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , ht)) ≤
k−1
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , ht)) +∑
Θk
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Uk(θk,qk(h0, h1, . . . , hk))+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , hk,θk+1, . . . ,θt)) =
=
k−1
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , ht)) +∑
Θk
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)
[
Uk(θk,qk(h0, h1, . . . , hk))+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt|Θk
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j) Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , hk,θk+1, . . . ,θt))
]
≤
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≤
k−1
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , ht)) +∑
Θk
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)
[
Uk(θk,qk(h0, h1, . . . , hk−1,θk))+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt|Θk
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j) Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , hk−1,θk, . . . ,θt))
]
=
k−1
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , ht))+
+
n
∑
t=k
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , hk−1,θk, . . . ,θt)).
This result is the induction step, which takes us to k = 1. The last step is applying
the 0-period ICC, which is also in S. Therefore, we have used expressions S to
obtain the ICCs.
Now consider n = ∞. The partial sum from k to ∞, of the series that gives the
buyer’s utility is
∞
∑
t=k
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0, h1, . . . , ht)),
which is bounded and must go to 0 as k→ ∞, if the function Ut is exponentially
bounded because of discounting. For an infinite direct mechanism that imple-
ments a menu, say that the infinite set of constraints S will hold. Let σ represent
the optimal strategy, mapping any buyer type and sequence of utility types to opti-
mal reports. From this, devise an approximate strategy that is a "truncated" version
of σ, in which the buyer reports according with the strategy σ up to period k, and
then he reports truthfully. Then it must be that the payoff from the new strategy is
an increasingly good approximation as k increases, since only the partial sum from
k on is changed. Fix k, and apply the compatibility conditions in S from period
k backwards to prove, again by induction, that the completely truthful strategy is
weakly better than the "truncated" σ, which approximates in payoff the original.
As k goes to infinity, we obtain that truthful reporting is weakly optimal in the
context of a menu satisfying S , which simply means that the regular ICCs have to
hold too.
Intuitively, the alternative conditions of Proposition 3.1 allow us to improve,
step by step, any non-truthful strategy by considering deviations towards truthful
reporting. Starting with an arbitrary strategy σ the last period, it must be that, if it
is preferable for the buyer to not lie regardless of the past history, he will improve
on σ by reporting truthfully. This must hold after any history, so we immediately
have that in the last period S implies truthful reporting. This allows us to move
to the previous period, where we again observe, history by history, that truthful
reporting is preferred, and so on by backward induction. This is possible since
there are compatibility conditions for any α type at each node; i.e., it is optimal
for the buyer not to lie, assuming truthful reporting in the future, even if he isn’t
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supposed to get this menu because he misrepresented his α. It is thus possible to
improve onto any σ by deviating towards the truthful strategy.
The result holds for n=∞ also, and the proof is by contradiction. Starting again
with a possibly non-truthful strategy σ, we can approximate it by assuming that
after period k the buyer decides to report truthfully. Only after period k will his
utility be changed by the new strategy, and the change is small if k is large. This
is true because we will need to incorporate discounting into Ut, and if the period
by period utility is bounded, then the partial sum over time that gives the buyer’s
total utility must converge. With the new strategy it is possible to use conditions in
S as before, to prove by backward induction that true reporting is superior to the
approximated σ. Then, in the limit k→∞, we must have that the true strategy is as
good as σ. But this statement is precisely the requirement that truthful strategies
satisfy the ICCs, which is what we need to prove.
Proposition 3.2. The set of ICCs in (1) imply a weaker set of compatibility conditions
(W), in which the buyer, who has reported his true type α if in periods after 0th, considers
only one-time deviations from truth, followed by truthful reporting in the future. That is,
the ICCs imply the following inequalities, for2 k ∈ 0,n , ∀ σ,α,Θk :
Uk(θk,qk(α, h1, . . . , hk−1,θk))+
+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt|Θk
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j)Ut(θt,qt(α, h1, . . . , hk−1,θk,θk+1, . . . ,θt)) ≥
≥Uk(θk,qk(α, h1, . . . , hk))+
+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt|Θk
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j)Ut(θt,qt(α, h1, . . . , hk,θk+1, . . . ,θt)), and
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(α,θ1, . . . ,θt)) ≥
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0,θ1, . . . ,θt)).
Proof. The idea is to observe that the compatibility conditions expressed inW can
be seen as just a subset of the ICCs. For the last inequality above, it is obvious. In
general, consider the ICC for two strategies, the truthful strategy and a deviation
to the strategy that reports truthfully except after a history (α, h1, . . . , hk−1), when
σk(α, h1, h2, . . . , hk−1,θk) = hk and, subsequently, again truthful reporting after any
continuation history. Define Hk ≡ (α, h1, . . . , hk−1,θk). You can simplify the ICC
by eliminating the payoffs for the histories Θn − Θn|Hk and their continuations,
2At k = 0 consider θ0 = α, and U0 = 0 as defined.
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which must be equal, so you get:
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Uk(θk,qk(α, h1, . . . , hk−1,θk))+
+
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt|Hk
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j)Ut(θt,qt(α, h1, . . . , hk−1,θk,θk+1, . . . ,θt)) ≥
≥
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Uk(θk,qk(α, h1, . . . , hk))+
+
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt|Hk
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j)Ut(θt,qt(α, h1, . . . , hk,θk+1, . . . ,θt))
Simplify the common factor to get the generic compatibility condition of W . In
this construction, we haven’t assumed n < ∞, so the result holds for the infinite
setting.
The intuition behind the proof rests on the observation that, if reporting truth-
fully is always better than not, then it is also better than lying only once, and that
the continuation utilities for a person who considers lying once are the same as for
a person who may have misrepresented his past utility types – θ, as long as he is
the same buyer type α. This is true because future payoffs depend only on reports
and the buyer type, which are both assumed the same. So having compatibility
conditions in each period checking whether a buyer prefers lying for that period
to true reporting is equivalent to considering some of the ICCs.
We can therefore say W ⊂ ICCs, and W ⊂ S is by definition. Proposition 3.1
says that if a menu satisfies S , then it also satisfies the ICCs, so we can think of
the set of possible menus under S as more restrictive than those that satisfy the
ICCs. In general, a menu implemented by a mechanism will be a point in the
menu parameter space. The sets of conditionsW ,S , ICCs will delimit a subset of
this space, where the menus inside obey the conditions. LetD[·] denote the subset.
Then we must have D[S ] ⊂ D[ICCs] ⊂ D[W] (Figure 2). Now consider the max-
imization problem that determines the optimal mechanism. To find the optimal
truthful mechanism we need to restrict the domain of menus to D[ICCs]. A con-
taining domain may generate a false maximum, if it is located outside D[ICCs],
while a subdomain can lead to maxima on its boundaries that could be subopti-
mal. To solve for the optimal mechanism, my strategy will be to find the optimal
menu in D[W ] and show that is is in D[S ].
3.2 Fixing some of the allocations
The next step is to reduce the possible ways in which a menu representing a truth-
ful mechanism can be constructed. From now on, we return to the two-type setting,
although the results will hold for an arbitrary number of types, if properly stated.
This section shows through a few lemmas that the optimal menu must have first
9
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FIGURE 2. The restricted domains according toW ,S , ICCs in the menu parameter
space.
best allocations for reports of θh, as well as for θl after type αh was reported. The
lemmas work for any n ≤∞, and also if we rephrase them with S instead ofW .
Lemma 3.1. Consider any period with allocations. Denote with qh,ql the quantities and
ph, pl the prices in the menu offered to the buyer in that period, contingent upon the θ-type
report, and let uh,ul be the expected continuation utilities for the buyer, given by the buyer
type and truthful reporting in the future. Then, if conditions W hold, it must be that
qh ≥ ql.
Proof. Assume the W compatibility conditions in the period hold. By them it is
w.l.o.g. that in the future the player will report truthfully. Then there are only two
continuation values that are needed to describe a player’s incentives, say uh and
ul, and:
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh.
We can rewrite the equations to:
θh(qh − ql) ≥ ph − pl + q2h/2− q2l /2+ ul − uh
ph − pl + q2h/2− q2l /2+ ul − uh ≥ θl(qh − ql),
from which you can deduce that (θh− θl)(qh− ql)≥ 0. Since θh > θl, we must have
that qh ≥ ql. This lemma remains true if we replaceW with S , because we would
have similar inequalities for each pair uαl ,u
α
h, leading to the same conclusion.
The result can be understood to mean that, if ql > qh and if a buyer with θl
prefers the low allocation and price to the high ones, then the buyer with θh must
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prefer it too, because his total utility is increased more by an increase in the allo-
cation, and future utility is determined only by today’s report, and not by today’s
true type. But this evidently contradicts a compatibility condition.
Lemma 3.2. Consider any period with allocations in the game described. Denote with
qh,ql the quantities and ph, pl the prices in the menu offered to the buyer in that period,
and let uh,ul be the expected continuation utilities. Assuming thatW hold, it must be that
qh ≥ θh and ql ≤ θl in the optimal menu.
Proof. Prove by contradiction, i.e., assume that qh < θh. Then ∃e> 0 s.t. qh + e< θh.
Now consider the following changes in the menu offered: qh → qh + e, and ph →
ph + (θh − qh)e− e2/2. Observe that both qh and ph are strictly increased.
The new expected utility of the buyer, when he truthfully reports θh, is:
θh(qh + e)− (qh + e)2/2− (ph + (θh − qh)e− e2/2) + uh = θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh.
When the buyer reports θl, everything stays the same. Now verify that the new
incentive compatibility conditions will also be satisfied:
θh(qh + e)− (qh + e)2/2− (ph + (θh − qh)e− e2/2) + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θl(qh + e)− (qh + e)2/2− (ph + (θh − qh)e− e2/2) + uh
⇔
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph − (θh − θl)e+ uh.
Because (θh − θl)e > 0, the old incentive compatibility conditions imply that these
hold. Any other constraints, either incentive compatibility constraints at other
nodes or individual rationality constraints, will not be changed, because the ex-
pected utility for the buyer does not change. Therefore we have found that there
is a way to strictly improve the seller’s expected return, without changing the ex-
pected payoff of the buyer. So this allocation is not optimal, therefore qh ≥ θh.
For the statement ql ≤ θl, prove by contradiction by assuming that ql ≥ θl. Then
∃e > 0 s.t. ql − e > θl. Now change the menu offered: ql → ql − e, and pl →
pl + (ql − θl)e − e2/2. Observe that ql is strictly decreased while pl is strictly in-
creased. The new expected utility for the buyer that truthfully reports θl does not
change:
θl(ql − e)− (ql − e)2/2− (pl + (ql − θl)e− e2/2) + ul = θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul.
Neither does the utility of the buyer that truthfully reports θh. The new incentive
compatibility constraints are:
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θh(ql − e)− (ql − e)2/2− (pl + (ql − θl)e− e2/2) + ul
θl(ql − e)− (ql − e)2/2− (pl + (ql − θl)e− e2/2) + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh
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⇔θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl − (θh − θl)e+ ul
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh.
These new conditions must hold if the old ones did. Also, no other compatibility or
rationality conditions will be changed. So this change improves the seller’s return,
therefore it must be that ql ≥ θl was suboptimal.
This lemma shows that the θh type must always be allocated at least the first
best in an optimal mechanism, because you can always increase a suboptimal allo-
cation, and then charge a higher price to compensate his utility increase, and this
change will not make the report θh better for any lower utility type. Similarly, al-
locating more than the first best to the low utility type is suboptimal because, if
the allocations is greater, then the seller can decrease it marginally, and compen-
sate by an increase in price, and this compensation would leave the lowest type
indifferent, but for all the other types it would be insufficient, therefore leaving
any constraints relaxed.
Lemma 3.3. Assume that in the setting presentedW hold, and the results of the previous
lemmas. Then, for every period, for each history, at most one of the compatibility conditions
inW for an agent α will bind.
Proof. Write again the ICCs:
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh.
Assume that both conditions above hold with equality. Then
θh(qh − ql) = q2h/2+ ph − uh − q2l /2− pl + ul
θl(qh − ql) = q2h/2+ ph − uh − q2l /2− pl + ul,
so θh(qh − ql) = θl(qh − ql). Because qh ≥ θh > θl ≥ ql, we have a contradiction.
From the previous lemma, we can also see that the high and low utility type al-
locations must be different, by the conditions inW . If more than one compatibility
conditions hold, then it says that the difference in utilities minus the difference in
prices for two alternatives has to be 0, and for more than one utility type. This is
not possible because utility differences for the same allocations are strictly mono-
tone in θ. A more general formulation of utility that would preserve the result has
Uθ(θ,q) > 0, and Uθ,q(θ,q) > 0 (known as the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condi-
tion).
Lemma 3.4. Consider any period with allocations, and assume the compatibility condition
inW for the buyer with θh-type utility does not bind. Then ql ≥ θl. Similarly, if the θl-type
condition does not bind, then qh ≤ θh.
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Proof. Say that ql < θl. Then ∃e> 0 s.t. ql + e< θl. Consider the menu transforma-
tion ql→ ql + e, pl→ pl + (θl − ql)e− e2/2. Then, the new incentive compatibility
conditions will be:
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θh(ql + e)− (ql + e)2/2− pl + (θl − ql)e− e2/2+ ul
θl(ql + e)− (ql + e)2/2− pl + (θl − ql)e− e2/2+ ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh.
⇔
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl + ul + (θh − θl)e
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh.
As long as e is small enough, the first incentive compatibility condition will hold
for the new menu. Moreover, the expected revenue of the seller is strictly increased
without affecting the buyer’s utility. For the second part of the statement, consider
now qh→ qh − e, ph→ ph + (qh − θh)e− e2/2. After reworking, the new incentive
compatibility conditions will be:{
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh + (θh − θl)e.
If the θl compatibility condition will not bind, then for a small enough e the above
conditions will hold. As before, the seller’s expected revenue is increased, but the
buyer’s payoffs are left the same.
Decreasing the high utility allocations marginally towards the first best and
then compensating the price will leave the high utility type indifferent, but it will
improve the high report option for the other type. However, if the old compati-
bility constraint was slack, a marginal increase in the high type allocation will not
violate the it. Similarly, you can argue that increasing the low type allocation to-
wards the first best and then compensating the low utility type with a higher price
will also be an improvement, but only if the high type’s compatibility constraint is
slack.
3.3 Solving the maximization problem
From now on assumeW hold and that in every period with allocations the θl-type
incentive compatibility condition does not bind, while for the case with σ0 = αh
the θh-type compatibility condition will also not have to bind, i.e., it is slack. With
the previous lemmas, the assumption gives us that, in every period after the 0th,
qh = θh, and that after σ0 = αh we must have in every subsequent period ql = θl.
Moreover, at period 0, we assume that only the rationality constraint for the αl-
type and the compatibility constraint for the αh-type bind. The proof requires that
we verify the assumptions after we find the solution.
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With the assumptions above, the allocations after reporting αh are fixed. The
seller needs to optimize the low demand type allocations if the buyer reported αl
in period 0. Since we have assumed that only the αl-type compatibility condition
binds in period 0, we can maximize the seller’s value, keeping track of the fact that
the information rent earned by a αh buyer pretending to have the αl-type must be
subtracted with the appropriate weight.
Lemma 3.5. The simplified seller’s maximization problem is given by the following recur-
sive form:
P(v) = max
{ph,pl ,vh,vl ,ql}
(1− ϕ)[αl ph + (1− αl)pl] + αlδP(vh) + (1− αl)δP(vl)+
ϕ[−αh(θ2h/2− ph)− (1− αh)(θlql − q2l /2− pl)] (3)
s.t. (i) θ2h/2− ph + δvh = θhql − q2l /2− pl + δvl,
(ii) v = αl(θ2h/2− ph) + (1− αl)(θlql − q2l /2− pl) + αlδvh + (1− αl)δvl,
(iii) ql ≥ 0.
Here v is the utility value for the buyer at the beginning of period 1, vh,vl are
his continuation utilities if he reports θh and θl respectively. Since we assumed that
the αl-type rationality constraint in period 0 holds with equality, we must have that
v = 0 in the first period. Because there is an indeterminacy in the price allocation,
we can also fix vh = vl = 0 to find explicit prices, but after we have determined the
quantity allocations from the maximization problem.
Proposition 3.3. Assuming that (iii) doesn’t bind, the allocation after reporting θl in the
maximization problem (3) is always given by
ql = θl − (θh − θl) ϕ1− ϕ ·
αh − αl
1− αl
and with the normalization vh = vl = 0,
ph =
θ2h
2
− (θh − θl)(1− αl)ql,
pl =(αl(θh − θl) + θl)ql −
q2l
2
.
(iii) holds with equality when θl(1−αl)
θh(αh−αl)+θl(1−αh) ≤ ϕ≤ 1, and in this case ql = 0, ph =
θ2h
2
and pl = 0 in every period.
Proof. First assume that (iii) doesn’t bind. Solve (i) and (ii) for ph and pl:
ph = −v + δvh +
θ2h
2
− ql(1− αl)(θh − θl),
pl = −
q2l
2
− v + vlδ+ ql(αl(θh − θl) + θl).
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Replace these expressions into the maximization problem, and get the first order
conditions. The first order condition determining ql will be:
(1− αl)(−1+ ϕ)ql
−1+ ϕ +
θl(1+ αhϕ− ϕ− αl)− (αh − αl)θhϕ
−1+ ϕ = 0.
This solves for the ql expression. Observe that the allocation is determined for
every period after period 0. Because we ignored the non-negativity constraint (iii),
it is necessary to see if ql is positive. It turns out that a necessary and sufficient
condition for that is:
ϕ ≤ θl(1− αl)
θh(αh − αl) + θl(1− αh) .
When this condition doesn’t hold, then ql = 0. To find the prices, it is necessary to
fix the indeterminacy by making some assumptions, because the seller can com-
mit on the contract offered, therefore changing the all the prices at period t by e
and compensating at period t + k by δke leaves the buyer with equivalent choices.
Moreover, there is a one-to-one trade-off for the buyer and the truthful seller be-
tween vh or vl and ph, pl. This suggests that neither the absolute, nor the relative
values of the continuation utilities vh,vl are fixed, and the easiest way to deal with
them is to assume vh = vl = 0. Of course, we have to check that the compatibility
constraints of the buyer that reports non-truthfully will also hold, but this assump-
tion makes all the four compatibility constraints for each node hold, because of (i).
Using the assumptions, we get the prices ph, pl in every period.
The next result gives the allocations and prices offered if the buyer reports αh
in period 0.
Proposition 3.4. The allocations after reporting αh are qh = θh and ql = θl, and
ph =
θ2h
2
− θhθl + αhθhθl + θ2l − αhθ2l
pl = αhθhθl +
θ2l
2
− αhθ2l ,
as well as a transfer of (αh−αl)(θh−θl)ql1−δ from the seller to cover the information rent for the
αh type buyer.
Proof. Solve the following equations, representing the binding θh-type incentive
compatibility and the buyer value identity respectively, after assuming again v =
vh = vl = 0:
αh
(
θ2h
2
− ph
)
+ (1− αh)
(
θ2l
2
− pl
)
= 0,
θ2h
2
− ph = θhθl −
θ2l
2
− pl,
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and this gives the results. We have assumed that the θh-type compatibility con-
dition must not bind, so that we can get ql = θl, yet we have obtained the above
solution making the exact opposite assumption. But that is fine, since the compat-
ibility condition is slack. To see that, change the solution above with a small value
κ:
ph =
θ2h
2
− θhθl + αhθhθl + θ2l − αhθ2l − (1− αh)κ
pl = αhθhθl +
θ2l
2
− αhθ2l + αhκ.
It is easy to check that, because the high and low demand compatibility conditions
cannot both bind at the same time, a κ small enough always exists that will leave
every condition satisfied with strict inequality. This allows us to deduce that ql = θl
was a good assumption.
It is left is to check that all the assumptions on which individual rationality or
compatibility conditions in W will bind have been correct. Because of the sym-
metry of the allocations after reporting α, it is obvious that all the compatibility
conditions in S are also satisfied. It was assumed that the θh-type condition holds
with equality, for the buyer who has reported his true α, which means that the
θl-type compatibility condition will also hold. If the buyer has not reported his
α-type truthfully, then the compatibility conditions starting from period 1 will be
essentially unchanged, because of the symmetry of the allocations, which means
that vh = vl.
The last thing we need to check are the conditions in period 0. The IRCs are
satisfied by construction. If an αh-type buyer reports αl, then the information rent
he earns is given by:
vh = (αh − αl)(θh − θl)ql + δαhvh + δ(1− αh)vh,
which solves to
(αh − αl)(θh − θl)ql
1− δ .
This is the transfer a αh-type buyer will get in period 0 in our solution, and the
expected utility starting from period 1 will be 0 by construction. Similarly, we can
find the expected utility of an αl-type buyer who reports αh:
(αh − αl)(θh − θl)(ql − θl)
1− δ < 0.
Therefore, the lower type wouldn’t report αh, so he gets a continuation utility of 0.
Because we have found a solution satisfying the stronger collection of compatibil-
ity conditions in S , it is the correct solution for the set of ICCs.
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4 Discussion
From the solution in Proposition 3.3, it can be seen intuitively that the distortion
of θl allocations is induced by the need to decrease rents for the αh type buyer. A
marginal increase ∆q in all allocations for θl reports of a αl buyer, at any period,
would lead to a proportional increase in rents ϕ(αh − αl)(θh − θl)∆q, and the extra
revenue for the seller is (1− ϕ)(1− αl)(θl− ql)∆q, in the first order approximation.
At equilibrium, the two must be equal, and this gives the result.
Now vary the different parameters, to see if the results coincide with those of
simpler problems. If ϕ = 0, then there is only an αl type, who must sign a contract
before he knows his first θ. As expected, our solution becomes ql = θl,qh = θh,
which is the classical dynamic contract when the buyer has no private information.
If ϕ→ 1, this leads to ql → 0, and to 0 rent for the high type buyer, because the αh
buyer becomes increasingly important, so his rent is weighted progressively more.
Again, in the limit we find the classical dynamic contract with one buyer type and
no private information. The same holds true when αh = αl, and it is because we
don’t have to distinctive buyer types anymore.
It is interesting to contrast the result with those of Battaglini (2005), who con-
siders that there is only one buyer type, but his utility determinant θ evolves ac-
cording to a Markov process, from a known prior distribution, and assumes that
high types will be correlated. He showed that the optimal dynamic contract for
such a setting converges to first best allocations as time passes. Furthermore, only
reporting a sequence of θl would lead to suboptimal allocations; once the buyer
has reported θh, it would be followed only by first best allocations. In this set-
ting, allocation distortions are permanent for a low buyer type, which leads to
consistent losses of social welfare. This comes in part from the fact that a Markov
process becomes progressively less connected to past information, so the buyer’s
private information – which usually leads to the allocation distortions – is in a
sense weaker. However, it is also arguable that the two settings are fundamentally
different, because in Battaglini (2005) the contract is signed after the buyer knows
his first θ value. We can also modify our problem to consider such a situation
(pending work), and the result is that there is a difference only in that first period,
when if θl is reported then q = θl − (θh − θl)Pr[θh]/Pr[θl], after which allocations
revert to the ones here. It is also interesting to note that, if we consider only two
periods of the game mentioned, then we must have the same solution as Battaglini,
since the information process is trivially Markov, and this checks out.
Consider now the problem faced by a mobile phone carrier. He must distin-
guish between two types of buyers, one that is either relatively poor, or that has a
lifestyle that doesn’t require many phone calls, and one who is likely to consume
many minutes. By the taxation principle, the contracts offered to them are the im-
plementation of a truthful mechanism. The result presented here suggests that the
optimal choice of contracts would have basically two, for each buyer type. Let’s
say that one contract has sufficient minutes included, and one has a flat pay-per-
use. When the buyer has a high utility draw, it means that his need for the call
is great, so he will take the call no matter what his phone plan is. If his utility
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draw is low, then the flat rate buyer will decide, maybe, to not make the call, or
talk less; but the buyer of the plan with minutes need not bother. It is also obvious
that the buyer who expects to have many calls will prefer the better plan, and he
will have to pay less per minute. The difference can be considered his information
rent, because he had the option to choose the flat rate plan in the beginning. This
description is consistent with typical consumer behavior. One can also think of
contracts that may or may not include additional features, like messages or data
plans, where the utility draw is over the usefulness of the feature. People who be-
lieve they will often need such features are more likely to buy a contract that will
allow them their use more often.
5 Conclusion
This paper deals with long term contracts between a principal and an agent, and
considers that the agent has private information that is not completely random or
fixed, but comes from the same prior distribution, which is his private informa-
tion. The optimal contracts for two types of buyers with two types of utilities have
some of the usual properties from the static problem, like no distortions for high
utility draws, but are radically different from the static or the infinite games with
random or persistent information. There is consistent distortion for the low type
buyer, when he reports a low utility, and the distortion decreases social welfare.
The results also provide some insight into the pricing strategies of monopolistic
suppliers of firms or franchises, and of mobile phone carriers.
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